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FIELD OF FOOD LAW
GROUP INTERESTS IN THE FIELD OF FOOD LAW
Reed Dickerson *
Professor Cowan's article raises some provocative issues that the
lawyers will do well to consider carefully. I am not sure that I see all
the implications of the questions raised, but there are some general
considerations that I would like to explore before I comment briefly
on the field of food law. Exploration of these considerations does not
imply criticism of Professor Cowan's thesis, because they are extensions
of ideas that I find hinted at in the article but, because of its general,
exploratory, and preliminary character, are not developed there.
In his first paragraph, Professor Cowan mentions groups such as
associations, unions, societies, boards, and so forth, together with
"amorphous collectivities" of a group character such as taxpayers and
consumers. Although much of the rest of the discussion deals with
groups of the former kind, the reader could easily get the impression
that both kinds may be lumped together as "groups" and that each
group may be treated, with respect to its "groupness," as being sub-
stantially like every other group. I do not think that the author intended
that result but, if he did, he may be inviting confusion. Clean results
in this area depend on careful definition and a constant awareness of
the kinds of groups involved in the particular controversy.
Professor Cowan, with some justification, finds the attempt to solve
social and legal problems on the basis of two fundamental concepts,
the "individual" and "society," inadequate. He concludes that a third
concept-that of the "group," which is more than the individual but
less than society as a whole-needs to be taken account of. But the
establishment of a significant and working trinity of Individual, Group,
and Society is more difficult than it may sound.
Whereas "individual" (the social building block) and "society" (the
social totality) are single, undifferentiated concepts, the concept of
"group" is highly differentiated and heterogeneous. In its endless per-
mutations and combinations of people, it represents an infinite series of
gradations between the "individual" at the one extreme and "society"
at the other. In fact, it is so highly differentiated and heterogeneous
that the number of significant statements that can be made in the law
about "group" in its most general, abstract sense must be very limited.
Some of these are made in Professor Cowan's article with respect to the
law's traditional approach to procedural problems.
Outside of instances such as these, nothing significant, in my opinion,
Professor of Law, Indiana University.
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can come of a "group" approach to a concrete problem unless the
characteristics of the particular kind of group involved are thoroughly
understood and taken account of.
It is beyond my capacity and the limits of this article to attempt any
exhaustive or systematic account of the myriad kinds of groups that
appear in present-day society. I will therefore limit my comments to
making what seem to me to be some elementary and important
distinctions.
In recognizing that all groups are not alike, the law must first
recognize that some groups are organic, while others are non-organic.
Thus, a labor union is an organic group; taxpayers as a group are not.
The United States Chamber of Commerce is an organic group; con-
sumers as a group are not. The distinction is vital particularly in mat-
ters of group protection because only an organic group can act as a
group in its own behalf. A non-organic group, on the other hand, can
be protected only by some entity other than the group, such as an
individual or an organic group. Even where a non-organic group is
aided from within its own membership, that aid can come only from
individuals or organic groups that differ from the non-organic group
and act independently of it.
The differences between specific organic groups and specific non-
organic groups are undoubtedly differences of degree and it would be
hard to locate the place where the one kind ends and the other begins.
This is unimportant. The important thing is that the fewer the con-
ditions to organic existence the group enjoys, the more it must rely
for its protection and advancement on individuals and other (organic)
groups. The converse would also seem to be true.
The fully organic group has a strong centripetal force to hold it
together. The fully non-organic group has nothing to hold it together.
It is simply a conceptualization imposed, usually from the outside,
on an aggregate of individuals who, though they may have a common
interest, have little or no awareness of their "groupness." This is not
to say, of course, that the non-organic group has no significance for
the law. It may have great significance, because the law is constantly
classifying people according to their interests (e.g., unsecured creditors,
purchasers in the ordinary course of trade, and infants). The point is
that the law will very likely want to treat a non-organic group differ-
ently from an organic group, at least with respect to the degree to which
it may wish to intercede affirmatively on the group's behalf.'
So much for sweeping over-generalizations. What does "groupness"
(current clich6 tempts me to say "togetherness") consist of in the food
i. The basic distinction between organic groups and non-organic groups sug-
gests the possible advisability of adopting the sociologists' practice of referring to
the latter under some other designation than ."group."
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field? The answer is the same as for any consumer product: very little,
so far as the consumer is concerned.
The consumer concept has given the sociologists and the economists,
as well as the lawyers, a lot of trouble. The fact that everyone is a
consumer of many things has led some persons to confuse the con-
sumer interest with the balanced aggregate of all human interests, the
"public interest," a patent absurdity, even though precisely the same
people (the "public") are involved. Because everyone eats, the same
confusion could well arise with respect to the "food consumer," which
is manifestly a narrower interest than that of "consumer." Similarly,
on the next level of particularity, with respect to the "consumer of
salt." The difference between the consumer interest and the public
interest is more obvious when you turn to groups such as the "con-
sumers of Peter Pan Peanut Butter," which obviously excludes large
numbers of at least the adult public and many persons of more tender
years who prefer Skippy Peanut Butter or another brand. Some of this
confusion can be avoided if you talk, as Professor Cowan does, not in
terms of people, but in terms of interests.
Now notice this: Every significant organic group has a common
interest that is (i) strong, (2) constant or frequently recurrent, and (3)
inter-connected.
The trouble with the consumers of products in general and the
consumers of food products in particular is that the more specific
the interest is (such as the interest in buying a jar of mayonnaise), the
more fleeting it is; whereas the more permanent it is (such as the inter-
est in buying canned goods in general), the more diffuse and hetero-
geneous it is.
Because of its apparent aptness, perhaps I may be forgiven for
repeating here what I stated on another occasion:
... it is helpful to remember that the word "consumer" means vari-
ously (i) an individual buyer, as related to a particular product he
wants, (2) an individual buyer, as related to the total of his purchas-
able wants, (3) all buyers who want a particular product, as they are
related to that product, or (4) all buyers (i.e., everybody), as related to
the total of their purchasable wants.
In sense (i) the word "consumer" denotes not a whole man, nor
even a constant aspect of a man, but a fleeting relationship. True, the
individual buyer may not consciously work in this transaction against
his interests in this transaction, but he may unconsciously work in
this transaction against his interests in other transactions. And con-
versely. This is just as true for the less concrete and less significant
sense (2), where his interest is, in the abstract, more pervasive, but
remains in individual situations an aggregate of separate interests no
better or differently coordinated.
In most economic situations of general significance, sense (3) is the
most important, because concrete problems normally involve particular
products or groups of products and all those who are interested as
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users in those products. Here the relevant consumer group not only is
limited in number but is comprised of constantly changing individuals
with only a momentary allegiance. The important fact here is that the
common interest in a common product provides no such adhesive,
necessary to group self-assertion, as it gives, through intimate and con-
tinued personal association, to organic entities such as the "laborer"
and the "producer." Add to this fact an increased disparity in sophisti-
cation between seller and buyer and you can see why the consumer
frequently needs special help.
When we say that "everyone is a consumer" (sense (4)), we mean
that everyone wants at least something that is purchasable, though
not necessarily the same thing or things. Here, the word "consumer"
relates to an undifferentiated group with no peculiarities whatsoever.
As this everybody-capable-of-buying-anything, the consumer has even
less group self-consciousness than under sense (3). The capacity for
group self-protection is correspondingly less.2
Few specific food demands are both strong and constant. Two
examples appear to be milk and bread. Do these common demands
furnish sufficient matrices around which to construct organic groups
of "consumers of milk" and "consumers of bread"? Working against
any such notion are several factors. One is that, important though
they may be, these demands do not, in the hierarchy of interests that
compete for the attention of an individual during a busy day, com-
mand more than a minute part of that attention. Another is the lack
of simultaneity. While one housewife may be fretting over a quart of
sour milk, another recipient of sour milk may be wondering how to
fix a leaky faucet. A third factor is the wide dispersion of even simul-
taneous common interests. While at eight o'clock on a given morning
seventy-five housewives may be fretting over seventy-five quarts of
sour milk, the chances are that they are so widely dispersed that they
are for the most part unknown to each other, even where they are
customers of the same milk company.
As a result, such scattered and fleeting interests are unlikely to lead
to the coming together of individuals that is necessary to group action.
The three factors just noted are more than enough to subvert any
fragile common interest that might otherwise form the basis of
organized group action.
As you move from products such as milk and bread, which are
bought by almost everyone almost daily, to products such as canned
beans, pork chops, and frozen chicken pie, which represent less uni-
versal and more occasional appetites, you get even less of the strength,
continuity, and inter-connectedness of specific common interests that
are the prerequisites to organized group action. These examples are
typical not only of food purchases but of purchases of consumer prod-
ucts generally. It is small wonder, then, that despite the occasional
2. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 7-8 (1951).
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consumer cooperative there has rarely been a significant grass-roots
consumer movement, either for particular consumer products or for
consumer products generally.8
You can solve the problem of strength and continuity of common
interest by the simple expedient of defining your consumer group in
terms, not of narrow food categories, but of broad food categories
such as "canned foods," "fresh vegetables," "processed foods," or even
"food generally." Ironically, by the same act you so diffuse the com-
mon interest that it could never serve as a sufficient bond for group
solidarity.
In addition to differing between the organic and the non-organic,
groups differ in other, sometimes related, respects. Some organic
groups are large; some are small. Some are strong; some are weak.
Some are complicated; some are simple. Some act constantly; some act
sporadically. Some are tight; some are loose. Some consist of indi-
viduals; some consist of other groups. And so on.
From this it seems clear that in a concrete situation no "group"
approach is likely to prove fruitful unless there is, at the outset, a
careful definition and evaluation of the group, or kind of group,
that is involved.
One difficulty I have with Professor Cowan's analysis is that of
drawing the line between "group interest" and "social interest." By
"social interest," does he mean (i) the aggregate of everyone's inter-
ests in everything (i.e., the "public interest"), (2) a particular interest,
such as food, that is shared by everyone, or (3) a group interest, such
as alcoholic beverages, that while not shared by everyone is of concern
to everyone? Although he uses "social interest" synonymously with
"public interest," a rereading of the article suggests that he is using
the phrase primarily in sense (2). If so, he appears to have omitted
the important concept of "public interest" as the useful ideal of bal-
ancing, at some point, all human interests. Such an omission would
seem unfortunate.
My own preference would be to reserve the word "social" for the
concept of public interest in its broadest sense and to treat all specific,
shared interests as "group interests," even where they are shared by
everyone. Thus, I would think it more useful to tieat the interest in
wholesome food as a "group" interest than to treat it as a "social"
interest.
Under this kind of group analysis, the problem faced by the United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is that of mediating
3. Occasionally an acute situation will provoke a spontaneous revolt of individual
consumers. Assistant General Counsel William W. Goodrich of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare cites instances where strong, spontaneous consumer
resistance neutralized forces tending to produce abrupt and exorbitant increases in
coffee and beef prices.
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between two sets of groups and groups of groups. On the side of the
food producers, and of the food distributors in their capacity as sellers,
the constituent groups (except for the shrinking unaffiliated grower)
appear to be all organic: individual food companies, specific food
industries made up of such companies, and organizations such as the
American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Association of
Frozen Food Packers, and the Millers' National Federation.
On the side of the food consumer, and of the food distributors in
their capacity as buyers, the constituent groups vary. The consumer
groups, and groups of groups, are almost entirely non-organic. The
food distributors, on the other hand, are for the most part organic.
Of all the organic groups that frequently act on behalf of the
consumer, such as the Food Law Institute, the American Medical Asso-
ciation, the Better Business Bureaus, the occasional consumer coop-
erative, and magazine services such as Consumers' Research and Con-
sumers Union, only the last two kinds intercede under any pretense
that they act as and for consumers as such. The rest find their central
reasons for existence in the exploitation of other interests.
In protecting buyers against impure food, FDA is not, of course,
concerned solely with protecting consumer groups. At least incidentally,
it also protects food distributors in their capacity as buyers. However,
being organic and sometimes economically stronger than the food
producers from whom they buy, these buyers normally offer less
occasion for solicitude. When their economic position is dominant,
they are often able to protect themselves by insisting on an adequate
product, quite apart from whatever weight they may carry with FDA
in instigating official action. Even so, whether or not they participate
in the process, they benefit from many of the measures that FDA
adopts on behalf of the amorphous collectivities that make up the "food
consumer." Conversely, the food consumer benefits incidentally from
whatever blows for pure food the food distributor may be able to
strike against the producer.
Considerations such as those discussed in this article invite the
makers of law to be highly cautious when confronted with sweeping
generalizations about the term "group" or "group interest" in its most
general and abstract sense.
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